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This paper proposes churned transfers as a measure of political inefficiency. A transfer
is churned when at least the same level of voter satisfaction could have been achieved
by lowering the voter’s tax burden by the amount of the transfer. Previous measures
of political efficiency---Pommerehne and Schneider (1983)---depend on the researcher￿s
assumptions about voter preferences. Churned transfers avoid this problem, but depend
on the researcher￿s assumptions about government tax and spending incidence. This paper
suggests fiscal churning as a supplement to measures of political efficiency that rely on
assumptions about the preferences of the median voter. Churning measures promise to
throw light on the Chicago-Virginia controversy over the efficiency of political systems.
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Introduction
The last twenty years has seen a rising interest in measures of political efficiency. Putting
a number to political efficiency is important to settling a dispute that has come to be known
as the Virginia-Chicago controversy. The Chicago view holds that politicians avoid sneaky
methods of redistributing money between interest groups; methods that impose needless
deadweight losses on citizens. A needless deadweight loss is one that does neither politician
nor voters any good. From time to time politicians may carry on inefficiently, but, like
a ten dollar bill on the sidewalk, the situation does not persist. Competition from other
politicians sees to it. The Virginia view holds that politicians will favor sneaky methods of
redistribution because of persistent biases in the beliefs of voters, government￿s stranglehold
on information, or because of faults in democratic institutions. Deciding which view best
suits the evidence is more than an academic quibble. As Rowley and Vachris (1994) have
emphasized, the Virginia view leads to strong prescriptions about the type of democratic
institutions a country should have. The Chicago view tends to minimize the importance of
institutions---a result in keeping with other Chicago inspired "irrelevance theorems" such as
the Modigliani-Miller theorem, and the Ricardian Equivalence theorem.
The present paper attempts to inject some empirical evidence into the debate on political
efficiency. I propose that churned transfers be used as a measure of political inefficiency. A
transfer is churned when the voter who receives it would have been just as well off or better
off with a tax cut of the same size as the transfer. The familiar example of churned transfers
is that of the middle class which is taxed, then given back a significant portion of those taxes
in the form of social security benefits or unemployment insurance. This sort of transfer is
inefficient in the sense that it destroys resources. The subsidy and tax that are at opposite
ends of the redistributive process that may impose needless deadweight losses. Recently
Browning (1993) has suggested that the marginal social cost of increasing net transfer by one
dollar in a system where everyone qualifies for taxes and transfers, may be as high as $3.5.
Part of these losses can be taken as a sign of political inefficiency if one believes that the
state is a caretaker of the economy and should be judged by how it fosters the economy’s
development. The state will have to impose some deadweight losses when it raises taxes,
but the money spent should raise the utility of at least some voters. Churned transfers mayPalda 3
do no one any good.
Churned transfers are a potentially useful measure of political inefficiency for two reasons.
First, significant amounts of government spending are devoted to taking money from a given
voter and spending that money back on the same voter. The amount of money that gets shifted
to special interests has been the focus of research on political inefficiency. Even though the
sums are impressive and merit attention, redistribution to farmers, defense contractors, and
dying industries is a minor part of government budgets. The key to the question of political
inefficiency may lie in asking whether the average citizen could be made better off by a
simultaneous cut to his taxes and a cut to the government services he receives.
The second reason to focus on churned transfers as a measure of political inefficiency is
that this measure does not rely on the researcher￿s opinion about what voters may want or not
want. All that is required to identify inefficiency is to pinpoint how much each citizen pays
in taxes and receives in transfers, and deduce how much of the transfer is churned with the
tax. The contrasting approach has been to define inefficiency as a deviation from the wishes
of the median voter. The study by Pommerehne and Schneider (1983) is in this spirit. They
took a sample of Swiss municipalities with direct democracy and estimated parameters of the
median voter’s demand for government. Using these parameters they forecast what demand
for government would have been in municipalities without direct democracy. They found that
forecast spending was lower than actual spending in municipalities without direct democracy.
They concluded that the lack of direct democracy allowed politicians to "overspend". The
problem with theirs and subsequent approaches in the same vein is that one has to believe
that the median voter model has a link to economic efficiency and that the political system
is in the median-voter equilibrium. Roll (1977) has made a similar critique of tests of stock
market efficiency, arguing that these tests are joint tests of the model and equilibrium. The
measure of efficiency proposed in this paper does not suffer from these shortcomings. The
central shortcoming of the measure, however, is that its validity depends on the assumptions
made about tax and spending incidence. No measure of churning is possible without such
assumptions. The reader who wishes to assess the efficiency of a political system must
decide which assumptions he feels most comfortable with: those of the median voter model,
or those of a model of tax and spending incidence.
The problem encountered when using churned transfers, is to define what churning meansPalda 4
and what link it has to efficiency. Measures of churning have been latent in the public
finance literature for a long time. Gillespie (1964) was among the first of many to look at the
incidence of government spending and taxes by income group. Neither he, nor subsequent
researchers, though, gave a formal definition to churning or related their findings to political
efficiency. This perhaps explains why they did not refine their analysis to ask by how much
government could lower taxes and spending without hurting a single voter. The answer to
this question depends on the degree to which a voter can substitute a refunded tax dollar for
the government spending he loses. The present paper addresses this question and shows that
multiple measures of churning must be considered.
I provide estimates of churning for Canada as a whole in 1990. I find that between 15.2%
and 49.2% of government spending may be churned. Both upper and lower bounds give
fuel to the point of view that large deadweight losses can persist in a political system even
if they bring no special interest group or politician any advantage. This seems to weight
against the Chicago view of political efficiency if one believes in the measures of churning
developed here and in their link to political efficiency.
These "macro" results can be broken down by income deciles to identify the possible
political causes of churning. I find that churning rises with income. This is a further strike
against the Chicago view of political efficiency. There is ample evidence to suggest that the
rich are more informed about politics than the poor. Under the Chicago view one would not
expect to find a strong plurality of the most informed voters allowing themselves to be the
central targets of fiscal churning.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 1 defines fiscal churning and relates it to
political efficiency. Section 2 describes the methods used to measure churning, and presents
estimates. Section 3 breaks down churning by different income deciles. The concluding
part of this paper suggests possible applications of churning measures. One application
is to develop churning measures at the municipal level and test whether different political
institutions at the municipal level lead to different levels of political inefficiency.
1. Political Efficiency
What is the point in measuring the pattern of transfers and taxes? The exercise saysPalda 5
something about whether a political system is making transfers efficiently. An efficient
pattern of transfers is one in which the needless deadweight losses a government imposes
on its subjects do not persist. A needless deadweight loss comes about when government
takes resources from one person and returns those resources to the same person in a fashion
that leaves him worse off, or no better off, than before. Needless deadweight loss is a
sign that either voters are poorly informed, or that they are informed but cannot use their
information to discipline their leaders. This is an important insight because deadweight losses
are not necessarily a sign that a government is politically inefficient. Deadweight losses
may simply reflect the reality that taxes are difficult to raise without causing large shifts
in consumption and effort. The funds raised at high cost though may be buying something
useful to the public, such as roads or care for the poor. In this case one cannot speak of
political inefficiency. Only when the funds provide no useful service can one begin to ask
whether resources are being wasted.
It is important to measure efficiency because there is no generally accepted model that
guarantees political equilibrium will maximize efficiency. As Rowley (1995) has explained
in a recent treatise on social choice, when it comes to government there is no reason to
believe we are living in the best of all possible worlds. The lack of a generally accepted
model of political equilibrium is at the heart of the Virginia-Chicago controversy on political
efficiency. A paper by Gary Becker (1983) has widely been quoted as an example of the
Chicago view that political equilibrium is efficient. Becker has since tried to explain the
limited nature of this claim. In his scheme efficiency does not mean politicians try to
minimize the deadweight losses from government transfers and taxes. Efficiency means that
interest groups only impose deadweight losses on others to the point where the benefit to the
receiving group from imposing deadweight losses outweighs the costs that would provoke
the paying group to a political counterstroke. Predatory groups have an interest to avoid
transfer schemes that impose deadweight losses which are not in line with the gains such
groups can expect to receive. Becker cautioned that minimizing deadweight loss is not the
only road to power. Interest groups who impose large losses on others can dominate if
they excel at manipulating election messages. Nothing says that democratic elections will
produce leaders who take good care of a country’s resources. Becker however believed that
politicians will minimize the needless deadweight losses from political activity. NeedlessPalda 6
losses are those that do no one any good. Wittman (1989) has used this as the basis of
his claim that a political system is inefficient if all individuals can be made better off given
the instruments of redistribution that are available . Coate and Morris (1995) have recently
provided a theoretical basis for the opposing Virginia view. They have shown that "when
voters have imperfect information about both the effects of policy and the predispositions of
politicians, inefficient methods of redistribution may be employed." What we need to weigh
the claims of these rival models is some measure of needless deadweight losses.
How should one measure a needless deadweight loss? Needless deadweight losses can
be caused by several different types of government policy. Regulations that serve no one’s
interest but harm businesses are one example. Needless deadweight losses may also come
about through churned transfers. It is these transfers I measure in the present paper, and
take as a proxy for needless deadweight loss. The degree of churning is the point to which
transfers and taxes could be reduced while increasing, or not decreasing, the individual’s
well-being. More formally, a transfer Fbefore is churned to the degree that the following
difference can be maximized
U(Xafter,T after,F after) − U(Xbefore,T before,F before)
Where (Tbefore,F before) are the tax and transfer levels before government reform, and
(Tafter,F after) are the tax and transfer levels of the individual after a government reform that
seeks to slice away all churned transfers. The variable X is the vector of privately purchased
goods the individual consumes. The degree of churning is the difference Tbefore − Tafter,
which is the same as Fbefore − Fafter. This definition is very general. It covers straight,
guaranteed cash transfers, such as social security and baby bonuses. The definition also
covers the case where there are government goods and services for which the individual
could find perfect substitutes in the private market, provided by the market at equal or lesser
cost. Education and health are two examples that spring to mind.
The first challenge to measuring the degree of churning is to justify the assumption that
the government service in question is truly being churned. For example, it is arguable that
a cash transfer program such as unemployment insurance is an insurance program for which
there is no substitute in the private market. It would be wrong to count these cash transfers
as churned, even if the individual on average pays in taxes what he withdraws in benefits.Palda 7
One answer to this challenge is to take the line of Tanzi and Schuknecht (1995), and Roberti
(1989). They believe that since the 1960￿s programs such as unemployment insurance, family
allowances (so-called baby bonuses), and old age security, have mutated into guaranteed
income support programs with no legitimate claim to acting as insurance. These programs
are now straight income transfers falling out of a zero-sum game of fiscal churning. Mueller
(1989) concurs and cites this churning as one of the central mysteries of public choice. My
approach to the challenge is to provide several estimates of churning. The most extreme
estimates count almost all government cash transfers and spending on public goods as open
to churning. Less extreme estimates limit the types of government spending that may be
considered churned.
The second challenge to my churning measure is whether to give different weight to
different sources of churning. I am taking churning as a proxy for needless deadweight
losses. But a dollar of churned cash transfers may entail more or less needless deadweight
loss than a dollar of churned spending on education. This problem formed the basis of a
debate by Aron and McGuire (1970), Maital (1979), and Meerman (1980) on how to value
public goods. In countries where most government spending is financed through general
revenues, it is probably less important to worry about this question. Providing citizens with
a broad basket of subsidized goods and services financed through general revenues may
mimic the effects of cash transfers financed through general revenues. In countries such as
Switzerland, where a high proportion of public goods is financed through user fees, it may
be important to treat churned transfers of public goods as an index of efficiency which is
separate from needless cash transfers. In cases such as Canada, which we study here, such
a distinction is less crucial, because user fees are a small part of government finances. If
my conjecture is false, and public goods form a large part of government budgets, then the
same level of churning in two different districts may represent two very different levels of
needless deadweight loss. This limits the usefulness of my measure as a tool for assessing the
efficiency of different political systems (though other more standard measures of efficiency,
such as the level of taxes, suffer from the same problem).
2. Estimates of Churned TransfersPalda 8
Incidence Assumptions
The way to measure efficiency is to look at the incidence of government spending and
taxes. The pursuit of incidence has a long history dating at least as far back as Gillespie
(1964). Efforts by Johnson (1968), Dodge (1975), Gillespie (1980), Piggott and Whalley
(1987), and others have followed. Some researchers set out a formal general equilibrium
model of the economy which they then solve for the final incidence of taxes and spending.
Others, such as Browning (1978) who mistrust the long chain of assumptions lashing together
the formal general equilibrium approach prefer to let their intuitions guide them. They make
a few simple assumptions about how taxes and government spending get distributed among
income groups. For example, if you believe that spending on education is proportional to
income, then you will assign a higher fraction of education expenses to high income groups
than to low income groups. If you believe that consumption taxes are proportional to factor
income, you will find that the rich pay more consumption tax.
A representative study of Canadian tax and spending incidence in the intuitive mold is
by Payette and Vaillancourt (1986). They used micro datasets on individual families for
the province of Quebec in 1981 in combination with macro information on government
finances. The present study takes Payette and Vaillancourt as its point of departure but
broadens their perspective from Quebec to the whole of Canada. Why focus on Canada?
This question needs to be asked because a international dataset known as The Government
Household Transfer Data Base is made available by the OECD and presents itself as an
obvious candidate for study. The Canadian dataset I use has the advantage of being more
complete. As well as allocating straight cash transfers, it allocates the transfers implicit in
health care, education, and public goods. The study also allocates taxes that no survey of
family income can uncover, such as corporate taxes, natural resource levies, and the revenues
of state alcohol monopolies. Allocation takes place in two steps. For example, to allocate
corporate taxes the first step is to determine how much capital income each family earned.
This information comes from The Survey of Consumer Finances . The next step is to divide
the family￿s capital income by the sum of all families￿ capital incomes and to multiply the
fraction by the total amount of corporate taxes collected in Canada. In this fashion corporate
taxes are ￿allocated￿ to individual families. The methodology is based on Browning￿s (1978)Palda 9
study of tax incidence. The Survey of Consumer Expenditures is used in a similar fashion,
following Payette and Vaillancourt (1986), to allocate government spending. The appendix
gives the assumptions used to distribute government spending and taxes to each family.
Estimates of the Degree of Churning
Table 1 shows the distribution of different types of benefits and costs of government by
household income decile in Canada in 1990 (Table 2 gives some demographic information
on the households in the sample). 1 The results here are in line with past studies that show
taxes rising with income, and certain categories of benefits rising with income. The benefits
that rise with income are health, education, culture, and certain types of social security such
as old age pensions and unemployment insurance (the benefits of these latter two programs
are mandated to rise with income up to a certain threshold). Other studies such as those
of Gillespie (1964, 1980), and Davies et al. (1984) make different assumptions about how
corporate taxes and certain categories of government spending are distributed. They tend
to find slightly more of the tax burden borne by the lower income deciles and slightly less
borne by the upper income deciles. If their analysis is more in line with reality than mine,
this means that the present paper is underestimating the level of churning. If the poor are
more heavily taxed than my measures indicate, then, because they are also heavy recipients
of transfers, they are the target of heavy churning. This means that my results will be
conservative compared to what other studies of incidence might find.
Table 1 is the basis for calculating the level of churned transfers. Table 3 is the central
table of this paper. It shows the degree to which taxes and transfers could be reduced in
each income decile, under six assumptions about what a churned transfer means. The first
two rows show the percentage by which taxes and spending could be reduced for the average
family in each of ten income deciles, under the assumption that all cash transfers are churned.
1I chose pre-transfer income to define deciles with the following example in mind. A poor family suffering
from extreme physical disabilities may receive transfer payments which make that family appear to be middle
or even upper-income. If there were many such families in the sample and I used post-transfer income to define
deciles I might deduce from looking at the data that high income families also receive generous transfers. This
would be a questionable deduction because for some families the causality runs in the opposing direction; they
are high income because they receive large transfers.Palda 10
All cash transfers include spending on pay-as-you-go government pension schemes for all
citizens, unemployment insurance payments, family allowance payments for children, and
other cash transfers. The total reduction in government spending possible from eliminating
churning of cash transfers comes to 15.2% of spending by all levels of government in Canada
in 1990.
The presence of certain the social services in my measure of churnable cash transfers can
be criticized. Unemployment insurance may in fact be a form of insurance for which citizens
gladly pay taxes. They would be dismayed by an equal drop in unemployment insurance
payments and in their taxes, in the same way that a family man would be dismayed if forced
to reduce his spending on life insurance. Even though a growing number of researchers
(Green and Riddel 1995, Tanzi and Schuknecht 1995, Roberti 1989) view unemployment
insurance, and other categories of social spending as a form of guaranteed income rather than
as insurance, I have decided to further disaggregate my measures of churning and allow the
reader to decide what measures best suit his views of political inefficiency. To this end, the
last three sets of rows in Table 3 narrow the assumptions about churning. They show by
how much taxes and government spending could be reduced if only pay-as-you-go pension
schemes were subject to churning, and similarly for family allowances and unemployment
insurance.
Another two sets of rows explore the more contentious claim that government spending
on user benefit goods are subject to churning. User benefit goods are defined in the top half
of Table 1. They include such items as government spending on hospitals, education, and
housing. If we want to count these services as churned, we have to believe that households
are indifferent between a dollar government spends on education, and a dollar the household
would spend if it had the choice. To measure this broader sort of churning I looked at each
family in the survey and asked if its non- public-goods benefits were above its taxes. If so,
then I assumed that this group’s taxes could be reduced to zero, and its benefits could fall by
the same amount as the tax fall. If the group’s taxes were greater than its non- public-good
benefits then I set these benefits to zero and reduced the group’s taxes by an equal amount.
Overall spending could fall by 40.6% without hurting anyone. The most controversial set
of rows are those labeled ‘‘All Spending Churned.￿ These rows were calculated on the
assumption that every dollar of government spending is a perfect substitute for a dollar of taxPalda 11
cuts. Under this broadest definition of churning all government spending could have fallen
by 49.2%.
3. Churning and the Chicago-Virginia Controversy
Table 2 suggests that the level of political inefficiency in Canada is strikingly large, even
under the weakest assumptions about what qualifies as a churned transfer. This seems to
provide embarrassingly strong support for the Virginia view of inefficient transfers. A theory
is needed to suggest under what circumstances churned transfers may serve a useful purpose.
Such a theory might attenuate the results found here.
The type of dataset I have used allows me to ask what accounts or does not account for
the level of churning in Table 3. Is lack of voter information to blame? Table 3 arranges
churning by income decile. If, as some researchers contend, the rich are more informed about
politics than the poor, the income deciles I have used may proxy as information deciles.
Table 3 shows that for all but the last two sets of rows, the degree of churning rises with
household income. It is particularly large for the top three family income deciles, who make
up 37% of all eligible voters (see last row of Table 2). If we can infer that this means
that churning worsens with the information level of households then the Chicago view of
efficiency faces a challenge. How can a large proportion of informed voters accept to support
a large and needless level of government spending?
In Palda (1996) I have suggested that churning may be a by-product of political ‘‘insurance￿
that citizens take out against being sneakily expropriated of their wealth by other citizens.
The universality of social benefits provides this insurance. Universality ties government￿s
hands and limits the degree to which some groups can use government to profit at the expense
of other groups. Even though I provide some evidence in Palda (1996) to support this claim,
empirical research on this question is still in its infancy. Churning is a large question mark
hanging over those who believe in the efficiency of current democratic systems.
Conclusion
This paper has used a standard model of fiscal incidence to pinpoint a potential political
inefficiency known as churning. Political inefficiency is a vague term with wide room forPalda 12
interpretation. My interpretation is that political inefficiency includes any government policy
that leads to needless deadweight losses. A policy imposes a needless deadweight loss if
no one profits from the policy and some may be set back by the policy. Churning of taxes
and transfers may lead to such deadweight losses. A cash or in-kind transfer is churned
when the individual who receives it could have been at least as well off with an equivalent
reduction in his taxes. There is controversy though over what types of transfers qualify as
churning. Is an old age security payment churned if it goes to a citizen who at the same time
is paying taxes on other sources of capital income? Are unemployment insurance payments
to citizens paying taxes churned? I developed different measures of churning based on these
objections. I found that at one extreme Canadian governments in 1990 could have made a
Pareto-improving reduction in its spending of 15.2%. At the other extreme, spending could
have fallen by 49.2%. I find that evidence suggesting that churning may be highest for the
most informed citizens in society, and that these highly churned groups form a large minority
of voters. This seems to go against the notion that needless deadweight losses cannot persist
in an climate of plentiful political information. This may suggest that the nature of Canada￿s
democratic institutions are to blame for the churning I find. Future research should strive to
develop a formal model of churning. It should also come up with churning measures across
districts and try to relate the level of churning to the democratic institutions that govern those
districts.Palda 13
APPENDIX
Distribution of Government Spending and Taxes by Income groups
The method used in the present paper for distributing the tax burden can be found in the work of Browning
(1978). The method for distributing the incidence of government spending follows Payette and Vaillancourt
(1986), with some exceptions listed below. The trick in figuring out who benefited from government spending
is to see who is consuming services and goods that are either provided directly by government or subsidized
by government. If we find that a family sends twice as many of its children to university as its neighbor then
we "allocate" twice as much government spending on university education to that family. To get the final
allocation we have to go through two steps. First find out how much each family consumes of the government
service relative to other families. In other words find out the shares of each family’s consumption (most of
this data comes from surveys). Next, multiply each family’s share by the total amount spent by all levels of
government (most of this data comes from government budgetary estimates).
Government spending shares are allocated across families by using two Statistics Canada surveys, the Survey
of Consumer Finance and the Family Expenditure Survey. The Survey of Consumer Finances covers 45,580
individual families (each is weighted so as to obtain the total number of families in the ten provinces), and
details socio- economic family characteristics. The Family Expenditure Survey gives information on family
expenditure for 4,856 families, including spending on automotive fuel, recreation, and medicines among others.
The series are merged using a technique pioneered by Payette and Vaillancourt. Here is how these series are
used to allocate government spending:
Cash Transfers These include Canada Pension Plan and Quebec Pension Plan payments, unemployment
insurance payments, family allowance payments, old age security payments and other transfers. The
incidence assumption with these transfers is that they should be completely allocated to the direct
recipients. This is implicitly assuming that supply of the goods that recipients buy is perfectly elastic,
so that none of the transfer is passed on to producers in form of higher prices.
Health The assumption here is that expenditures on health are made on behalf of those who consume health
services (this of course neglects the possibility that health has public goods features which also benefit
those who do not directly consumer health services). Who consumes these services is catalogued in part
by a Statistics Canada study of hospital expenditure by age group (Statistics Canada, catalogue 83-522E
"An Analysis of Hospital expenditures in Canada") which is then merged with the population data from
the survey of consumer finances.
Education It is assumed that education expenses are proportional to the number of people in the family who
are attending school. The surveys used show the number of students attending a elementary, secondary,
and post-secondary school and these data are used to allocate total government spending on schooling.
This of course neglects the possibility that schooling has public goods features which also benefit those
who do not have children attending school.Palda 14
Regional Planning and Development and Resource Conservation and Industrial Development (specifically
Agriculture, Tourism, and Trade and Industry) Expenditures on agriculture are assumed to be made on
behalf of farmers and are allocated equally to all families reporting net farm self-employed income in
the Survey of Consumer Finances. Regional planning and development chiefly covers municipal public
works and could be distributed on a per household basis. Trade and industry is a more direct help to
business and could thus be distributed by a series on dividends. Fifty percent of the sum of regional
planning and development and trade and industry (including tourism) is allocated by capital income and
the remaining fifty percent is allocated across families by the series on total consumption. The first series
come from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the second is derived from the Family Expenditure
Survey.
Labour The assumption is that expenditures in this category are made on behalf of labour and thus are
allocated directly to labour using a series on wages and salaries from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
To the extent that these expenditures are made to trainees and the unemployed, this series will understate
expenditures made on behalf of the lower income groups.
Housing Government housing expenditures are distributed by the series "Other Government Transfer Payments"
from the Survey of Consumer Finances.
Culture and Recreation The assumption is that culture and recreation expenditures are made on behalf of
those people who consume culture and recreation services. Thus, these expenditures should be allocated
directly to them. Expenditures are distributed across families by the series, "Consumption of Recreation,"
derived from the Family Expenditure Survey, which covers everything from movies and ballets to camping
equipment and stereos.
Transportation and Communications Expenditures under transportation and communications are broken down
into two categories: highway and other. Highway expenditures are on highways, roads, and road
maintenance. Other expenditures are on air, rail, and water. Who benefits from these expenditures?
Four groups are identified under the sub-function highway. Two per cent of highway expenditures are
allocated to national defense as that is approximately the expenditure on defense as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product. National defense is distributed proportionately across individuals. Following
Gillespie (1980) two other groups are non-users and road-users. He allocates one third of government
expenditures to non-users and two thirds to road-users. The logic is that the non-user group that benefits
are property owners, that is their property values are enhanced by access to roadways. These non-user
beneficiaries can be identified by their capital income as listed in the Survey of Consumer Finances. The
other group road-users can be further sub-divided into two groups: those who benefit from the lower
prices of goods transported via roads and those who consume road services to travel, to go to work. One
third of the two thirds set aside for road-users is allocated to those benefiting from the lower price of
transported goods by a series on total consumption from the Family Expenditure Survey. The remainder
is allocated to consumption of road services, which is proxied by the consumption of automotive fuel.Palda 15
This series is derived from the Family Expenditure Survey. Other transportation is distributed equally
across individuals.
Environment, Foreign Affairs and International Assistance, General Services, Other, Protection of Persons and
Property, Research Establishments, Resource Conservation and Industrial Development net of Agriculture,
Tourism, and Trade and Industry These categories of expenditure about as close as one can get to
pure public good spending. So the approach here has been to allocate spending on these categories
proportionally across families.
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WHAT CANADIAN HOUSEHOLDS IN DIFFERENT INCOME DECILES ON AVERAGE
GOT OUT OF SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES IN 1990 (DOLLARS)
Decile 1 234567891 0
User Benefit Goods:
Cash Transfers 13,123 11,360 9,613 7,370 6,772 5,786 5,776 5,599 5,248 6,078
of which:
Unemployment Insurance 342 1,586 1,967 1,648 1,616 1,349 1,251 1,060 1,002 668
Canada and Quebec 1,676 1,735 1,633 1,202 1,084 984 1,010 1,073 991 1,379
Pension Plans
Family Allowances 143 136 169 229 251 291 347 352 340 321
Old Age Security 4,480 2,908 1,865 1,183 1,000 782 805 842 807 1,284
Other Transfers 1,736 1,310 1,022 813 705 609 591 562 516 582
Health 4,090 3,695 3,475 3,410 3,583 3,697 4,092 4,287 4,397 4,883
Education 1,973 2,515 2,283 2,701 2,949 3,533 4,040 4,333 4,600 4,612
Resource Conservation 423 704 950 1,059 1,193 1,242 1,307 1,454 1,479 2,143
& Industrial Development
Labor 5 51 144 244 329 426 506 601 718 822
Housing 379 365 353 336 299 278 252 236 217 224
Culture & Recreation 157 204 295 398 507 626 738 864 1,049 1,413
Transportation & 624 764 949 1,100 1,245 1,402 1,578 1,766 1,962 2,911
Communication
Sub Total 21,535 20,076 18,547 17,168 17,474 17,652 19,028 19,938 20,518 24,190
Benefit Goods
Public Goods:
Environment 436 457 497 570 615 691 756 805 833 869
General Services 1,196 1,258 1,378 1,564 1,681 1,863 2,024 2,131 2,167 2,233
Other (excluding interest charges) 312 331 362 409 447 499 554 589 619 654
Protection of Persons 1,474 1,570 1,730 1,931 2,134 2,342 2,617 2,736 2,838 2,995
& Property
Research Establishments 112 120 131 148 162 180 197 209 215 223
Foreign Affairs & 220 236 257 290 317 351 387 409 422 440
International Assitance
Subtotal 3,751 3,972 4,355 4,913 5,356 5,927 6,534 6,879 7,094 7,414
Public Goods
Total Benefits 25,311 24,047 22,903 22,080 22,830 23,578 25,562 26,817 27,612 31,604
Tax 343 2,476 6,786 10,900 15,378 20,130 25,493 31,725 41,385 74,061
Net Benefits 24,957 21,572 16,117 11,180 7,452 3,448 69 -4,908 -13,772 -42,457
Note: There are a total of 45,580 families in the sample. Statistics Canada has assigned a weight to each to make the sample
representative of the total population. Cash Transfers are a subset of all benefit goods. The category "Total Benefits" includes
government spending on public goods, cash transfers and benefit goods. The values are dollar value averages for households in
each decile.TABLE 2
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF HOUSEHOLD AVERAGES
BY INCOME DECILE (CANADA 1990)
Decile 123456789 1 0
Age of Head 54.9 48.4 45.7 43.8 43.2 43.7 43.7 44.6 46.5 50.3
Number of Children 0.34 0.45 0.46 0.62 0.70 0.87 1.08 1.03 1.23 1.00
% of Household where 10% 9% 10% 3% 4% 3% 1% 3% 4% 0%
Head is a Student
% of Households where 39% 58% 64% 66% 78% 86% 87% 89% 93% 98%
Head is Male
% of Households where 15% 13% 15% 14% 15% 16% 12% 22% 17% 18%
Head is an Immigrant
% of Households where 48% 44% 32% 26% 20% 18% 15% 21% 15% 23%
Head is over 65
% of Eligible Voters 7% 8% 8% 9% 9% 10% 11% 11% 13% 13%
in Decile
Note: There are a total of 45,580 families in the sample. Statistics Canada has assigned a
weight to each to make the sample representative of the total population. The percentage
of eligible voters is not the same in each income decile because higher deciles have more
voting age members in each household. The percentage of voters does not sum quite to
100% due to rounding.TABLE 3
DEGREE TO WHICH GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND TAXES COULD BE REDUCED
AND LEAVE HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH DECILE AT LEAST AS WELL OFF AS BEFORE
UNDER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT WHAT QUALIFIES AS FISCAL
CHURNING (CANADA 1990, MILLIONS OF 1990 CANADIAN DOLLARS)
Decile 123456789 1 0
Cash Transfers Churned
% Fall in Benefits 3.3% 8.7% 18.4% 18.3% 18.8% 16.8% 15.9% 15.3% 14.0% 14.4%
% Fall in Taxes 97.6% 78.6% 62.9% 44.3% 35.3% 25.6% 21.0% 16.5% 12.2% 8.6%
Total Fall in Benefits 256 2,085 4,724 5,288 5,889 5,557 5,724 5,731 5,452 6,343
and Taxes (millions 1990 $’s)
Benefit Goods Churned
% Fall in Benefits 4.8% 14.3% 37.1% 48.5% 56.1% 61.8% 65.1% 68.2% 70.5% 74.0%
% Fall in Taxes 99.9% 99.6% 91.1% 78.5% 73.5% 69.2% 64.9% 58.7% 49.4% 36.4%
Total Fall in Benefits 339 2,549 6,424 8,864 11,655 14,273 16,886 19,135 20,750 25,082
and Taxes (millions 1990 $’s)
All Spending Churned
% Fall in Benefits 4.9% 14.7% 43.9% 62.1% 71.0% 79.2% 85.0% 91.7% 96.3% 99.0%
% Fall in Taxes 100.0% 99.9% 97.2% 87.5% 82.3% 79.8% 77.2% 73.6% 64.0% 47.5%
Total Fall in Benefits 349 2,571 6,850 9,860 13,049 16,496 20,174 24,031 26,908 32,366
and Taxes (millions 1990 $’s)
Family Allowances Churned
% Fall in Benefits 2.0% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9%
% Fall in Taxes 23.9% 8.8% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0% 1.6% 1.5% 1.2% 0.9% 0.5%
Total Fall in Benefits 47 120 175 239 262 304 362 368 355 334
and Taxes (millions 1990 $’s)
Unemployment Insurance Churned
% Fall in Benefits 2.0% 2.6% 6.0% 5.1% 5.1% 4.1% 3.6% 3.0% 2.6% 1.6%
% Fall in Taxes 11.6% 22.1% 20.8% 13.5% 10.1% 6.6% 5.0% 3.4% 2.5% 1.1%
Total Fall in Benefits 41 608 1,497 1,556 1,622 1,394 1,302 1,107 1,047 695
and Taxes (millions 1990 $’s)
Canada and Quebec
Pension Plans Churned
% Fall in Benefits 2.6% 3.0% 4.8% 3.8% 3.3% 3.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 3.3%
% Fall in Taxes 41.3% 29.9% 18.6% 9.0% 6.0% 4.3% 3.5% 3.0% 2.1% 1.8%
Total Fall in Benefits 105 911 1,547 1,228 1,129 1,026 1,053 1,122 1,035 1,441
and Taxes (millions 1990 $’s)
Note: This table shows the average reduction in taxes and spending possible within each household income decile under different
assumptions about what sorts of government spending qualify as fiscal churning. Perhaps the least controversial assumption is that
cash transfers can are subject to churning. Benefit goods, and then all categories of government spending follow in generality,
and contentioussness, as spending that may be churned. For those who question cash transfers as capable of being churned I
have broken these transfers into their components (family allowances, unemployment insurance, and state pensions among others.